






Buckley v. Valeo 
Buckley v. Valeo 
The disclosure provisions, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-437, lie 
at the very heart of the statutory scheme under attack in 
this litigation. Unlike the limitations on contributions 
and expenditures in 18 U.S.C. § 608, the disclosure require-
. A 
ments are not challenged by appellants as per se unconstitutional 
restrictions on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms of 
speech and association. Indeed, appellants argue that 
"narrowly drawn disclosure requirements are the proper 
solution to virtually all the evils Congress sought to 
1 
remedy. . • II 
The particular requirements 
embodied in FECA are attacked as overbroad - both in their 
application to minor-party and independent candidates and 
in their extension to contributions as small as $10 or $100. 
Appellants also challenge the provision for disclosure by 
those who make independent contributions and expenditures, 
2 U.S.C. § 434(e), and the exemption from reporting of 
certain services rendered to incumbent Congressmen. § 434(d). 





in the provisions challenged here. We affirm the deter-
minations on overbreadth and§ 434(d) and hold that§ 434(e), 
if narrowly construed,also is within constitutional bounds. 
The first federal disclosure law was enacted in 1910. 
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 823. It required 
political committees operating to influence Congressional 
names of 
elections in two or more states to disclose/all contributors 
of above $100; identification of recipients of expenditures 
of over $10 was also required. Id. §§ 5-6, 36 Stat. 823-824. 
Annual expenditures of over $50 "for the purpose of 
influencing or controlling, in two or more states, the 
,, 
result of a congressional election had to be reported 
independently if they were not made through a political 
committee. Id. §7, 36 Stat. 824. In 1911 the Act was - . 
revised to include prenomination transactions such as those 
involved in conventions and primary campaigns. Act of 
August 19, 1911, ch. 33, § 2, 37 Stat. 26. See United States 
v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575-576 (1957). 
W Disclosure requirements were broadened in the Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43 
.-/ 
3. 
Stat. 1070. That Act required political connnittees, 
defined as organizations which accept contributions or 
make expenditures "for the purpose of influencing or 
attempting to influence" the Presidential or Vice-Presidential 
' . (a) · · (b) 
elections/in two or more states or/as a subsidiary of a 
national connnittee, id. § 302(c), 43 Stat. 1070, to report 
total contributions and expenditures, including the names 
and addresses of contributors of over $100 and recipients 
of over $10 in a calendar year. Id. § 305(a), 43 Stat. 
1071. The Act was upheld against a _challenge that it 
infringed upon the perogatives of the states in Burroughs 
v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). The Court held that 
it was within the power of Congress "to pass appropriate 
legislation to safeguard [a Presidential] election from 
the improper use of money to influence the result." 290 
U.S., at 545. Although the disclosure requirements were 
3 
widely circumvented, no further attempts were made to 
tighten them until 1960, when the Senate passed a bill 
some 
that would close/existing loopholes. S. 2436. 106 
Cong. Rec. 1193 (Jan. 25, 1960). The attempt aborted 
because no similar effort was made in the House. 
/ 
4. 
The present provisions were enacted as part of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 
86 Stat. 3, as amended by the Federal Election Campaign 
Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 83 Stat. 1263 
(1975). That Act replaced all prior disclosure laws. Its 
primary disclosure provisions impose reporting obligations 
on "political committees" and candidates. "Political 
committee" is defined in§ 43l(d) as a group of persons 
which receives "constributions" or makes "expenditures" 
of over $1,000 in a calendar year. "Contributions" and 
"expenditures" are defined in lengthy parallel provisions 
5 
similar to those in title 18, discussed above. Both 
4 
definitions focus on the use of money or other objects of 
value "for the purpose of influencing" the nomination or 
election of any person to federal office. §§ 431(e)(l), 
431(f)(l). 
required 
Each political committee is/to iegister with the 
* 
Federal Election Commissio~ § 433, and to keep detailed 
records of both contributions and expenditures. § 432(c)-(d). 
These records are required to include the name and address 
. / 
5. 
of everyone making a contribution in excess of $10, along 
with the date and amount of the contribution. If a person's 
contributions aggregate more than $100, his occupation and 
principal plac,of business is to be included. § 432(c)(2). 
These files are subject to periodic audits and field 
investigations by the ~orrnnission. § 438(a)(8)1\Each com-
mittee and each candidate .also is _required to file quarterly 
periodic reports,§ 434(a). The reports are to contain 
detailed financial information, including the full name, 
mailing address, occupation, and principal place of 
business of each person who has contributed over $100 in 
a calendar year, as well as the amount and date of the 
contributions. § 434(b). They are to be made available 
by the Corrnnission "for public inspection and copying." 
§ 438(a)(4). Every candidate for Federal office is 
required to designate a "principal campaign committee," 
which is to receive reports of ,contributions and 
expenditures made on the candidate's behalf from other 
political committees and to compile and file these reports, 
together with its own statements, with the Commission. 
§ 432(£). 
.. / 
Every individual or group, other than a political 
corrnnittee or candidate, who makes "contributions" or 
"expenditures" of over $100 "other than by contribution 
to a political corrnnittee or a candidate" is required to 
file a statement with the Corrnnission. § 434(e). Any 
6. 
violation of the disclosure provisions is punishable by a 
fine of not more than $1,000 or a prison term of riot more 
than a year. § 44l(a). 
I 
Unlike the overall limitations on contributions and 
expenditures ., the disclosure requirements impose no ceiling 
on · campaign-related activities. But we have 
repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can 
seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. E.g., Gibson v. Florida 
Legislative Investigation Corrnnittee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 
U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 





_Alabama, supra, where we said that "[e)ffective advocacy 
of both public and private points of view ... is 
undeniably enhanced by group association." 357 U.S., at 
460. Freedom of association, and privacy in the exercise 
of that freedom, has been recognized as "a peripheral First 
Amendment right," "not expressly included in the First 
Amendment [but] necessary in making the express guarantees 
fully meaningful." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
483 (1965). Of course, this right, and the attendant privacy 
interest, extends to associations for political purposes, 
for the right to engage in political speech lies at the 
core of First Amendment freedoms. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 
U.S. 477, 487-488 (1975); Corrnnunity Party of Indiana v. 
Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 449 (1974); Kusper v. Pontikes, 
414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973). 
We have also long recognized that significant encroach-
ments on First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled 
disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing 
of some legitimate governmental interest. Since Alabama 
- ~ ~ . . . . 
we have required that the subordinating 'interests of the 
. 6 
state be compelling. 
8. 
I . 
We also have insisted· that there be a ".relevant correlation" 
, ' 
8 
or "substantial relation" between the governmental interest 
and the infonnation required to be disclosed. This type of 
scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on 
the exercise of First Amendment rights arises, nct:through 
direct government action, but indirectly, as an unintended 
but inevitable result of the government's conduct. Kusper 
v. Pontikes, supra, at 57-58; NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 
461. 
Appellees argue that ,the disclosure requirements of 
FECA differ significantly from those at issue in Alabama 
and its progeny because FECA only requires disclosure of 
the names of contributors and does not compel political 
organizations to submit the names of their members. 
Appellees further argue, and the Court of Appeals agreed, 
that the applicable test for evaluating the FECA requirements 
is that adopted in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968),~or cases in which '"speech' and 'nonspeech' elements 
are combined in the same course of conduct." !s!,., at 376. 
7 
9. 
O'Brien is appropriate, appellee~ contend, because the 
Act is directed toward the spending of money, and money 
introduces a nonspeech element. 
9 
As the discussion above indicates, we find O'Brien 
inapposite, for money is a neutral element, not always 
associated with speech but a necessary and integral part 
of many, perhaps most, forms of communication. Moreover, 
the O'Brien test would not be met, even if it were applicable. 
O'Brien requires that "the governmental interest [be] 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression." . Id., 
at 377. The government interest furthered by the disclosure 
.-✓ 
requirements is not unrelated to the "suppression" of 
speech,at least insofar as the requirements are designed 
to facilitate the detection of violations of the contribution 
limitations set out in 18 U.S.C. § 608. 
As we have seen, group association is protected 
because it enhances "[e]ffective advocacy." Alabama, 
supra, at 460. The right to join together for "the advancement 
of beliefs and ideas," id., is diluted if it does 
.. / 
10. 
not include the right to pool money through contributions, 
for funds are often essential if "advocacy" is to be truly 
or optimally "effective". Moreover, the invasion of privacy 
of beliefs -is as great when the information sought concerns 
the giving and spending of money as it is when the subject 
is membership lists; fort'[f]inancial transactions can reveal 
much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs." 
California Bankers Ass'n, v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78 (1974) 
(Powell, J., concurring). Our past decisions have not 
drawn fine lines between contributors and members but have 
treated them interchangeably. In Bates, for example, we 
applied the principles of Alabama and reversed convictions 
for failure to comply with a ,city ordinance that required 
the disclosure of "due.s, assessments, and contributions 
paid, by whom and when paid." 361 U.S. at 518. See also 
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S . 41 (1953) (setting aside 
a contempt conviction of an organization official who 
refused to disclose names of those who made bulk purchases 
of books sold by the organization). 
_./ 
11. 
The strict test established by Alabama is necessary 
because compelled disclosure has the potential for 
substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment 
rights. But we have acknowledged that there.are government 
interests sufficiently compelling to outweigh the possibility 
of infringement, particularly when "the free functioning of 
our national institutions" is involved. Connnunist Party v. 
Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961). 
';the government interests sought to be vindicated by 
the disclosure requirements of FECA are of this magnitude. 
They fall into three categories. First, disclosure provides 
the electorate with information 11as to where political 
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the 
the voters 
candidates" in order to aid/in evaluating those who seek 
11 
Federal office. It allows voters to place each candidate 
in the political spectrum more precisely than is often 
possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign 
speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial support 
alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate 
is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitates 
predictions of future performance in office. 
. ~/~ 
12. 
Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption 
and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large 
12 
contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity. 
This prevents the use of money for improper purposes either 
before or after the election. A public armed with information 
on a candidate's most generous supporters is better able to 
detect any post-election special favors that may be given in 
13 
return. And, as we recognized in Burroughs v. United States, 
290 U.S., at 58, Congress could reasonably conclude that 
full disclosure during an election campaign tends "to 
prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections." 
Congress' purpose in enacting FECA goes even further, for it 
was also concerned with whatit perceived to be an increasing 
feeling among the average American voter that the 
political system is a closed and insulated structure where 
"a candidate can buy an election by spending large amounts 
of money in a campaign." S. Rep. No. 564, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 4 (1974). Through disclosure - in combination 
with the contribution limitations - Congress sought to 
_,/ 
open the system as wide as possible. It may have been 
mindful of Justice Brandeis' advice: 
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for 
social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectantf4 electric light the most efficient policeman. 
13. 
Third, and not least significant, disclosure require-
ments are an essential tool for the gathering of the data 
necessary to detect violations of the contribution limita-
tions described above. 
The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, 
directly serve very substantial governmental interests. 
In determining whether these interests are sufficient to 
justify the disclosure requirements we must look to the 
extent of the burden that they place on individual rights. 
We cannot assume that disclosure gifts to candidates 
and political parties will significantly deter contributions 
or expose contributors to harassment because of their 
15 
associational ties . In fact, as appellants concede, 
disclosure requirements, in most applications, may be the 
least restrictive means of curbing the evils of corruption 
16 
and ignorance that Congress sought to check. Appellants 
first argue that the balance tips against disclosure when 
it is required of contributors to certain minor parties. 
We turn to this contention next. 
14. 
II 
Appellants ' contend that the FECA requirements are 
overbroad insofar as they apply to contributions to minor 
parties and independent candidates because the governmental 
interest in this information is minimal and the danger of 
significant infringement on First Amendment rights is 
greatly increased. 
A : 
In Alabama, the organization had "made an uncontroverted 
showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity 
of its rank-and-file members [had] exposed these members 
to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical 
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility," 
_./ 
357 U.S., at 462, and the state was unable to show that the 
disclosure it sought had a "substantial bearing" on the 
issues it sought to clarify. 357 U.S., at 464. Under those 
circumstances, the Court held that "whatever interest the 
State may have in [disclosure] has not been shown to be 
sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional 
objections." Id., at 465. 
15. 
The Court of Appeals rejected appellants' suggestion 
that this case fits into the Alabama mold. It concluded 
that compelling government interests in "informing the 
electorate and preventing the corruption of the political 
process" were furthered by requiring disclosure of minor 
parties and independent candidates, 519 F.2d., at 867, and 
therefore found no "tenable rationale for assuming that 
the public interest in minority party disclosure of 
contributions above a reasonable cut-off point is .uniformly 
outweighed by potential contributors' associational rights." 
Id., at 868. The court left open the question of the 
l 
application of the FECA disclosure requirements to candidates 
.. / 
and parties who could demonstrate injury of the sort at 
stake in Alabama. No record of harassment on a similar 
scale was found in this case. We agree with the Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that Alabama is inapposite where, as 
here, any serious infringement on First Amendment rights 
brought about by the compelled disclosure of contributors 
is highly speculative. 
16. 
B 
It is true that the governmental interest in 
disclosure is diminished when the contribution in question 
is made to a minor party with little chance of winning an 
election. As minor parties usually represent definite and 
publicized viewpoints, there is less need to inform the 
voters of the interests that their candidates represent. 
Major parties encompass candidates of greater diversity. 
In many situations the label "Republican" or "Democrat" 
tells a voter increasingly ·little. The candidate who bears 
it may be supported by funds from the far right, the far 
left ., or. any place in betwe.en on the political spectrum. 
_,.. It is less likely that a candidate of, say, the Socialist 
Labor Party will represent interests tha t cannot be 
discerned from the party's ideological position. 
The government's interest in deterring the "buying" 
of elections and undue influence of large contributors on 
officeholders also may be reduced where contributions to 
a minor party or its candidate are concerned, for it is 
less likely that the candidate will be victorious. To 
be sure, a minor party sometimes can play a significant 
role in an election. Even when its candi date has little 
__ / 
17. 
or no chance of winning, major party interests may encourage 
minor party candidates in order to divert votes from other 
17 
major party contenders. 
We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure 
to the associational interests of the minor parties and 
their members and to supporters of independents could 
be significant. These movements are less likely to have 
a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to 
falloffs in contributions. In some instances fears of 
reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the 
movement cannot remain viable. The public interest also 
suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a 




and without the political arena. 
There could well be a case, similar to those before 
the court in Alabama and Bates, where the threat to the 
exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious and the 
state interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that 
the FECA requirements cannot be constitutionally applied. 
But no appellant in this case has tendered record evidence 
of the sort preferred in Alabama. Instead, appellants 
./ 
18. 
primarily rely on "the clearly articulated fears of 
20 
individuals, well experienced in the political process." 
At best they offer the testimony of several minor party 
officials that one or two persons refused to make 
21 
contributions because of the possibility of disclosure. 
On this record, the substantial interests identified by 
the legislative history of this Act outweigh the harm 
generally alleged . 
c. 
Appellants agree that "the record here does not 
reflect the kind of focused and insistent harassment 
of contributors and members that existed in the NAACP 
22 
cases." They argue, however, that a per se exemption 
for minor parties is necessary lest irreparable injury 
be done before the ·requir~d - evidence can be gathered. 
Those parties that would be sufficiently "minor" 
to be exempted from the requirements of§ 434 could 
be defined, appellants suggest, along the lines used for 
public financing purposes, see 26 U.S.C. § 9002(7), (8), 
_/ 
19. 
as those who received less than 25% of the vote in past 
elections. Appellants do not argue that this line is 
constitutionally required. They suggest as an alternative 
defining "minor parties" as those who do not qualify for 
automatic ballot access under state law. PresumablY.> other 
criteria, such as cu~rent political strength(measured by 
polls or petitioiy, age, or degree of organization, could 
23 
also be used. r e difficulty with these suggestions is 
that they reflect only a party's past or present political 
strength and that is only one of the factors that must be 
considered. Some of the criteria are not precisely indicative 
J 
of even that factor. Age, or past political success, for 
instance, may typically be associated with parties who have 
a high probability of success. But not all long-established 
paries are winners - some are consistent losers - and a 
newcomer may garner a great deal of support if he can 
associate himself with an issue that has captured the 
public's imagination. None of the criteria suggested t 
-is · precisely related to the other critical factor that 
must be considered, the possibility of deterrence arising 
20. 
from disclosure. Age is even underinclusive, for it 
would presumably leave long-established but unpopular 
24 
parties subject to the disclosure · requirements. 
D 
A dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals ·concedes 
27 
that no one line is "constitutionally required." It 
argues, however, that a flat exemption for minor parties 
must be carved out, even if along arbitrary lines, if 
groups that would suffer impermissibly from disclosure are to 
be given any real protection. An approach that 
requires minor parties to submit evidence that the 
disclosure requirements cannot constitutionally be applies 
to . them offers only an illusory safeguard, the argument 
.. , 
goes, because the "evils of chill and harassment ... are 
28 
largely incapable of formal proof. 11 This dissent 
expressed its concern that a minor party, particularly 
a new party, may never be able to prove a substantial 
threat of harassment, however real that threat may be, 
because it would be required to come forward with witnesses 
21. 
who are too fearful to contribute but not too fearful 
to testify about their fear. A strict requirement that 
chill and harassment be directly attributable to the 
specific disclosure from which the exemption is sought 
would make the task even more difficult. 
We recognize that rigid proof requirements could 
impose a heavy burden, but it does not follow that a 
per se exemption is necessary. Minor parties must 
be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof 
of injury to assure a fair consideration of their crime. 
A party that. seeks to establish that the disclosure provisions 
are unconstitutional as applied to its contributor list must 
_/ 
prove (1) that it is unlikely to be a significant political 
force, and (2) that disclosure of its contributors' names 
is likely to subject them to threats, harassment, or 
reprisals. But the evidence offered in support of these 
showings need not be rigidly restricted. The first 
requirement can be met by demonstrating - perhaps 
through current opinion polls or past election 
performances that the party is so lacking in political 
22. 
strength that it is unlikely to command any significant 
share of the votes. If this is established, the govern-
ment interests in disclosure are minimal, for the party 
will not even be an attractive "stalking horse" for a major 
party. The second requirement may be met, for example, 
by specific evidence of past or present harassment of 
members due to their associational ties, or of harassment 
directed against the organization itself. A pattern of 
threats or manifestations of public hostility may be 
sufficient. New parties that have no history upon which 
to draw may be able to offer evidence of reprisals and 
threats directed against individuals or organizations 
/ 
holding similar views. 
Where it exists, the type of chill and harassment 
identified in Alabama can be shown. We certainly cannot 
assume that courts will be insensitive to similar showings 
when made in future cases. We therefore conclude that a 




Section 434(e) requires "[e]very person (other than 
a political connnittee or candidate) who makes contributions 
or expenditures" aggregating over $100 in a calendar year 
"other than by contribution to a political committee or 
2~ 
candidate" to file a statement with the Connnission. 
Unlike the other disclosure provisions, this section does 
not seek the contribution list of any political association. 
It requires direct disclosure of what an individual or group 
spends. The same strict standard of scrutiny applies, for 
the right of associational privacy developed in Alabama, 
supra, - derives from the rights of the 
organization's members to advocate, in the most effective 
way possible, their personal points of view. Id., at 
460. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
A. 
Appellants attack§ 434(e) as a direct intrusion on 
privacy of belief, in violation of Talley v. California, 
362 U.S. 60 (1963), and as imposing ''very real practical 
burdens •.. certain to deter individuals from making 
expenditures for their independent political speech" of the 
24. 
sort held unconstitutional in Thomas v. Collins, 323 
U.S. 516 (1945). 
The rourt of A,peals upheld§ 434(e) as necessary to 
enforce the independent expenditure ceiling imposed by 
18 U.S.C. § 608(e). It said: 
If •.. Congress has both the authority and 
a compelling interest to regulate independent 
expenditures under section 608(e), surely it 
can require that there be disclosure to prevent 
misuse of the spending channel. 
have _ 9-
519 F.2d,at 869. We/found that§ 608(e) __._pose$too 
29 
great an infringement upon First Amendment rights. 
If the sole function of§ 434(e) were to aid in the enforce-
ment of that provision, it would no longer serve any 
governmental purpose. 
But the two provisions are not so intimately tied. 
The . legislative history on the function of§ 434(e) is 
bare, but it was clearly intended to stand alone. -N!Jll.t'.9..t 
was enacted with the general disclosure provisions in 
1971 as part of the original Federal Election Campaign 
30 31 
Act, while§ 608(e) was part of the 1974 amendments. 
Like the other disclosure provisions, §434(e) could play 





and expenditure limitations included inll974 amendments but~also 
has independent functions. Section 434(e) is part of 
Congress' effort to achieve "total disclosure" by reaching 
32 
"every kind of political activity" in order to insure that 
the voters are -a.,__ fully informed a-s,. e@B8ib~ and to achieve 
the maximum deterrence to corruption and undue influence 
possible through publicity. The provision is responsive 
to the legitimate fear that efforts would be made, as they 
33 
had been in the past, to avoid the disclosure requirements 
by routing financial support of candidates through avenues 
not explicitly covered by the general provisions of the ·Act. 
~-
In its effort to be all-inclusive, however, the 
provision raises serious problems of vagueness, particularly 
treacherous where, as here, the violation of its terms 
34 
carries criminal penalties and fear of incurring these 
sanctions may deter those who seek to exercise protected 
First Amendment rights. 
Section 434(e) applies to "[e]very person ... who 
makes contributions or expenditures ... " "Contributions" 
26. 
and "expenditures'r are defined in parallel provisions 
in terms of the use of money or other valuable assets 
"for the purpose of influencing" the nomination or election 
35 
of candidates for Federal office. It is the reach of 
this phrase that may pose constitutional problems. 
Due process requires that a criminal statute provide 
adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that 
his contemplated conduct is illegal, for "no man shall be 
held criminally responsible for conduct which he could 
not reasonably understand to be proscribed." United States 
3'-/1 U,S. t,,J;;.., j ~lff~t/) / 
v. Harriss, 
1
,.sup-ra, at] 61/.; See also Papachristou v. 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Where First Amendment 
rights are involved, an even "greater degree of specificity" 
Sm/lh .-. ~,ven, 
is required. 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1975). See Grayned v. 
/\ 
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 156, ,108 (1972); Kunz z. New 
York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 
We have held that there is a substantial governmental 
interest in shedding full light on campaign-related spending 
for both information and antiseptic purposes. Where dis-
closure requirements are narrowly directed to that end, 
• 27. 
they are constitutional even though they potentially burden 
the core protected area.of political speech. It is essential, 
however, that the requirements be narrowly drawn to serve 
the specified government ends. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 
(1960). Section 434(e), if literally construed, could be 
applied in areas where the nexus between the information 
sought and the interests to be protected is too tenuous __/ 
to withstand ~~ · g_ 36 the ~t~crutiny. 
~1 
We have described the slipperiness of the distinction 
between advocacy of the election or defeat of a political 
candidate and the ~ure~ nonpartisan discussion of issues. 
Although discussions of this latter sort may be carried 
~ rl 
on by persons who have no interest in any particular 
~ 
candidate they have the potential to influence the decisions 
of the voters, especially where the ideas discussed are 
also raised and developed in the course of the campaign. 
To a degree most, perhaps all, nonpartisan issue discussion 
• contemplates some political impact - if only to seek to 
stir the public interest to achieve concrete results or to 
28. 
arouse a movement of such force that candidates will adopt 
the views espoused. But where the spending of money to 
advocate· ideas has such an attenuated connection with 
political campaigns it poses no significant threat of 
corruption or undue influence. There is no control by 
the candidate of the ideas expressed and aid to any given 
campaign is indirect and unpredictable. Moreover, the 
value of data on those who spend money for pure discussion 
is ~it tells the voters at most the names of those 
individuals and groups who share the candidates' views on 
a given issue. These are not necessarily the candidate's 
supporters. Nor are . they persons to whom the candidate 
is likely to feel an obligation after election. 
c . . 
Therefs no legislative history to guide us in 
determining the scope of the critical phrase "for the 
...... 
- --~ '-purpose of 
/influencing." It appears to have been adopted without 
38 
comment from earlier disclosure acts. Congress ''has 
voiced its wishes in [most] muted strains," leaving us 
to make "those common-sense assumptions that must be 
made in determining direction without a compass." 
/, 
29. 
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 412 (1970). Where the 
constitutional requirement of definiteness is at stake, 
we have the further obligation to construe the statute, if 
that can be done consistent with the legislature's purpose, 
in order to avoid the shoals of vagueness. United States 
v. Harriss, supra, 347 U.S., at 618; United States v. Rumely, 
345 U.S. 41, 45 (1973). 
In enacting FECA Congress _addressed broadly the 
problem of political campaign financing. It wished to 
promote full disclosure of campaign-oriented spending in 
order to insure both the reality and the appearance of 
39 
the purity and openness of the federal election process. 
"fpr the p:urpose.o:f: influencing" incorporated in §434(e) 
throu~n the ctetinitioq ot 
Our tasR is to construe/"contributions" and "expenditures," 
in a manner that furthers this goal 
in a sufficiently precise manner. 
Above we discussed what constituted a "contribution" 
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 591(e) for purposes of the 
40 
contribution limitations. We construed that term to 
include, not only contributions made directly to a 
candidate or corrnnittee} and contributions made to other 
organizations or individuals but earmarked for political 
purposes but also expenditures "authorized or requested 
) 
30. 
by the candidate, an authorized corrnnittee of the candidate, 
or an agent of the candidate." The definition of 
"contribution" in§ 431(e) for disclosure purposes parallels 
the definition in§ 591(e) almost word for word, and we 
construe the former provision as we have the latter. Even 
so extended, "contributions" have a sufficiently close 
connection with the goals of the Act, for they are wedded 
directly to a candidate or a campaign. 
When we attempt to define "expenditure" in a similarly 
narrow way we encounter line-drawing problems of the sort 
we faced in§ 608(e). Although the phrase, "for the purpose 
of influencing" an election or nomination, differs from 
._. the language used in' ~ 608.(e,) ., it shares the same potential for 
encompassing both nonpartisan discussion and advocacy of 
41 
a political result. 
The general requirement that "political corrnnittees" 
and candidates disclose their expenditures could raise 
similar vagueness problems, for it too turns on the 
definition of "expenditure" in§ 431(f). "Political 
. , 
31. 
committee" is · defined only in terms of amount of 
42 
annual "contributions" and "expenditures," and could be 
interpre·ted to reach groups engaged purely in nonpartisan 
issue discussion. The lower courts have construed the 
43 
phrase more narrowly. To fulfill the purposes of the 
Act it need only encompass organizations which are under 
the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which 
is the nomination or election of a candidate. Expenditures 
of candidates and of "political committees" so construed can 
be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be 
addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign-
related . 
But when the speaker is not within these categories -
when it is an individual other than a candidate or a group 
44 
other than a "political committee" - the relation of the 
information sought to the purposes of the Act may be too 
remote. To insure that the reach of§ 434(e) is not 
impermissibly broad, we construe "expenditure" for purposes 
of that section in the same way we construed the term 
for purposes of§ 608(e) - to reach only funds used for · 
communications that expressly advocate the election or 
32. 
defeat of an identifiable candidate. This reading is directed 
precisely to that spending that is unambiguously related to the 
campaign of a particular federal candidate. 
In summary, § 434(e) as construed imposes independent 
reporting requirements on individuals and groups that are not 
candidates or political committees only in the following circum-
stances: (1) when they m?ke contributions earmarked for political 
purposes or authorized or requested by a candidate or his agent, 
to some person other than a candidate or political committee, 
and (2) when they make an expenditure for a communication that 
expressly advocates the election or defeat of an 'indentifiable 
candidate. 
,✓ So narrowed, the section still serves legitimate and govern-
mental interests, for it increases the fund of information con-
cerning those who support the candidates and goes beyond the general 
disclosure requirements to shed the light of publicity on 
independent but expressly partisan spending as well as on any 
spending directed by the candidate. 
Section 434(e), as we have construed it, does not 
contain the infirmities of the regulations before the 
Court in Talley v. California, supra, and Thomas v. 
Collins, supra. The ordinance found wanting in Talley 
forbade all distribution of handbills which did not 
33. 
contain the name of the preparer, distributor or sponsor. 
The city urged that it was aimed at identifying those 
responsible for fraud, false advertising, and libel, but 
the Court found that the ordinance was "in no manner so 
limited." 262 U.S., at 63. Here, as we have seen, the 
disclosure requirement is narrowly limited to those 
situations where the information sought has a substantial 
connection with these governmental interests. Thomas 
held unconstitutional a prior restraint in the form of 
a registration requirement for labor organizers. The 
Court found the state's interest insufficient to justify 
the destructive effect of the statute. The burden imposed 
by§ 434(e) is no prior restraint, but a reasonable and 
minimally restrictive method of opening the basic processes 
of our democracy to public view. 
IV 
Appellants' third contention, again based on alleged 
overbreadth, is that the monetary thresholds in the 
disclosure provisions lack a substantial nexus with the 
34. 
claimed governmental interests, for they are too low even to 
r 
attract the attention of the candidate, much less have 
a corru~ting influence. 
The provisions contain two thresholds. Records are 
to be kept of the name and addresses of those who make 
contributions in excess of $10, § 432(c)(2), and these 
records are subject to Commission audit. § 438(a)(8). 
If a person's contributions aggregate more than $100, 
his name and address, as well as his occupation and 
principal place of business, are to be included in reports 
filed with the Commission, § 434(b)(2), and made available 
for public inspection. § 438(a)(4). 
_ _/' 
The €curt of ~peals rejected appellants' contention. 
It found the challenge on First Amendment grounds to the 
$10 threshold to be premature, for it could "discern no 
basis in the statute for authorizing disclosure outside 
the Commission •.. , and hence no substantial 'inhibitory 
effect' operating upon" appellants. 519 F.2d, at 865. The 
$100 threshold was found to be within the "reasonable 
latitude" given the legislature "as to where to draw the 
line. 519 F.2d at 865. We agree. 
35. 
The $10 and $100 thresholds are indeed low and may 
impose serious and unwelcome bureaucratic burdens on those 
engaged in the political process. Moreover, there is little 
in the legislative history to indicate that Congress focused 
carefully on the appropriate level at which to require 
recording and disclosure. Rather, it seems merely to have 
adopted the thresholds existing in similar disclosure laws 
45 
since 1910. But we cannot require Congress to establish 
that it has chosen the highest reasonable threshold. The 
line is necessarily arbitrary, and one best left to 
congressional discretion. We cannot say that the ·limits 
46 
designated are wholly without rationality. 
We are mindful that disclosure serves informational 
functions, as well as the prevention of corruption and the 
enforcement of the contribution limitations. Congress 
is not required to set a threshold that i~ tailored only 
to the latter goals. In addition, even the enforcement 
goal cannot be well served if the threshold is so high 
that disclosure becomes equivalent to admitting violation 
of the contribution limitations. 
_. / 
36. 
The $10 threshold, in a somewhat similar fashion, 
facilitates the enforcement of the other disclosure 
facilities by making it relatively difficult to aggregate 
secret contributions in amounts that surpass the $100 limit. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that there is no warrant 
for assuming that public disclosure of contributions between 
$10 and $100 is authorized by the Act. Accordingly, we do 
not reach the question whether information concerning 
gifts of this size can be made available to the public 
without trespassing impermissibly on First Amendment rights. 
Cf. California Bankers Asdn v. Shultz, supra, 416 U.S., at 
55-57. 
Appellants' final argument is directed against§ 434(d), 
which exempts from the reporting requirements certain 
"photographic, matting, or recording services" furnished 
47 
to Congressmen in nonelection years. We again agree with the 
Court of Appeals that, in the absence of evidence of misuse 
or undue discriminatory impact, this provision represents 
a reasonable accommodation between the legitimate and 
to communicate with their constituents and activities 
necessary efforts of the legislators fiesigned to win elections 
~ 
by legislators in their other role as politicians. 
37. 
In sunnnary, we find no constitutional infinnities in 






A. In 2 U.S.C. § 437h, Congress indicated its desire 
to provide for judicial review to the limits permitted by 
Article III of the Constitution. See infra, at . - We 
must therefore decide whether appellants have alleged the 
" "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy necessary 
to meet the requirements of Article III. Baker v. ~' 
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). Both organizational and 
individual appellants challenge the disclosure provisions. 
When disclosure of its members or contributors is sought 
from an organization we have held that the organization 
"may assert, on behalf of its members, a right personal 
to them to be protected from compelled disclosure . . . 
of their affiliation." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 
458 (1958). See also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 
U.S. 516, 523 n.9 (1960). 
Appellants Conservative Party of New York, Mississippi 
Republican Party, and Eugene McCarthy have each alleged 
that they have received and expect to receive contributions 
of over $100. They also allege incidents that lead them 
to fear that they will suffer financial harm through loss 
. / 
B. 
of contributions and that their contributing members will 
either 
be injured/through being deterred from exercising their 
right to contribute or through harassment if they exercise 
that right. Appellant Stewart Mott has engaged in and 
plans to engage in both political and issue-oriented 
independent spending that may be subject to the reporting 
requirements of§ 434(e). Therefore, the challenged 
provisions directly and unambiguously apply to activities 
in which several of the appellants engage and seek to 
These appellants 
engage. / are now in the position of having to choose 
between the risk of criminal prosecution under§ 441 and 
conformity to a statute which they allege would create a 
substantial deprivation - in b~ loss of funds and support, 
and in forced abstinence from activities protected by the 
First Amendment. When political campaigns are involved, 
the choice is particularly difficult, for candidates risk 
both criminal prosecution and the political costs that 
prosecution would entail, 
1. Appellants' brief, at 171. 
C. 
2. The Court of Appeals did hold 2 U.S.C. § 437a 
unconstitutional on the ground that it was impermissibly 
vague and incapable of a narrowing interpretation consistent 
with the express intention of Congress. That ruling was 
not appealed. 
Section 437a required reports equivalent to those 
filed by political committees from any group which "expends 
any funds or commits any act directed to the public for 
the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election, or 
who publishes or broadcasts to the public any material 
referring to a candidate ..• advocating the election of 
defeat of such candidate, setting forth the candidate's 
.. /' 
position on any public issue, his voting record, or other 
official acts .•• , or otherwise designed to influence 
individuals to cast their votes for or against such 
candidate or to withhold their votes from such candidate." 
3. Past disclosure laws were relatively easy to 
circumvent because candidates were required to report 
only contributions which they received themselves or which 
were received by others for them with their knowlege or 
D. 
consent. 2 U.S.C. § 246 (1970). The data that was 
reported was virtually impossible to use because there 
were no uniform rules for the compiling of reports or 
provisions . for requiring corrections and additions. 
See Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 




These are contained in§ 431: 
( e )"'contrib11tion"-
(l) nwans n gift, subscript.ion, loan, advance, or deposit of 
money or anything of value ma(le for the purpose of-
. (A) influencing the> nomination for election, or 0lcction. of 
any person to Federal office or for the purpose of influencing 
the results of a primary held for the selection of delegates to 
a national nominating convention of a, political party; or 
(B) influencing the result of an election held for the ex-
press10n of a preference for the nomination of persons for 
election to the office of President of the United States; 
(2) means a contract, promise, or a crreement, expressed or im-
plied, whether or not legally enforceatlc, to make a contribution 
for such purposes; 
(3) means funds received by a political committee which are 
transferred to such committee from another political committee 
or other source; 
(4) means the payment, by any person other than a candidate 
or a political committee, of compensation for the personal services 
of another person which are rendered to such candidate or politi-
cal committee without charge for any such purpose; but 
( 5) docs not include- . . . .· 
(A) the value of services provided without compensation 
by individuals who volunteer a portion .or all of their time 
on behalf of a candidate or political committee; 
(B) the use of real or personal property and the cost of 
im·itations, food, and beverages, voluntarily provided by an 
indiYidual to a candidate in rendering voluntary personal 
services on the inclividuaFs residential premises for candi-
date-related activities; . . . · 
( C) the sale of any food or beverage by a vendor for use in 
ii, candidate:s campaign at a, charge less tha,n the normal com-
parable charge, if such charge for use in a candidate's cam-
paign is at least equal to the cost of such food or benrage to 
the vendor; 
(D) any unreimbursed payment for travel expenses made 
by an individual ,Yho on his own behalf volunteers his per-
sonal services to a candidate; 
(E) the payment by a State or local committee of a politi-
cal party of the costs of preparation, display, or mailing or 
other distribution ineurred by such committee with respect 
to a printed slate card or sample ballot, or other printed list-
ing, of three or more candidates for any public office for 
which an election is held in the State in which such commit-
tee is organized, except that this clause shall not apply in the 
case of costs incurred by such committee with respect to :t 
display of any such listing made on broadcasting stations, or 
in newspapers, magazines, or other similar types of general 
public political advertising; or 
(F) any payment made or obligation incurred by a cor-
poration or a labor organization which, under the provisions 
of the last paragraph of section 610 of title 18, United States 
Code, would not constitute an expenditure by such corpora-
tion or labor organization; 
to the extent that the cumulatiYe Yalue of activities by any in-
dividual on behalf of any candidate under each of clauses (B), 
(C), and (D) does not exceed $300 with respect to any election; 
(f) "expenditme:,_ 
(1) means n purchase>, payment, distribution, loan, advance>, 
deposit, or gift of money or anything of rnlnc, made for the l?lll'-
pose o_f- , - - ' 
. (A} jnfl_:1encing t_he nominatio:r:i-_for _electi_on, o_r the elec-
tion, of any person to Frderal ofiice, or to the office of presi-
dential and Yice presidential elector; or 
(B) _infl_~e1~ci1~~ the r~~ul_ts_ of~ primary election held for 
the select10n of ctclegates to a national nominating conYen-
tion of a, political party or for the expr0ssion of a preference 
for the nomination of persons for election to ihe oflice of 
President of the united States; 
(2) ml'ans a contract, promise. or ngrP(•mcnt, express or implied, 
whether or not-legally 011foreeable, to make any expenditure; 
(3) !l1('nns the transfrr of fonds by a political committee to 
another political committee; but 
E. 
(4) docs not include- . 
(A) any news story, comment_nry, _or editorial <listributerl 
through the facilities of any broaJcasting station, ucwspapcr, 
mngnzine, or otlH' r pe>riodical publication, unless such facili-
ties arc owned or cont rolled by any political party, political 
committee, or candidate; 
(B) nonpartisan activity designed to encourage indi,·id-
uals to register to vote, or to vote; 
(C) nny communication by any membership organization 
or corporation to its members or stockholders, if such mem-
bership org:rnization or corporation is not organized primar-
ily for the purpose of influencing the nomination for election, 
or election, of any person to Federal office; . 
(D) the use of real or personal property and the cost of 
invitations, food , and benragcs, voluntarily provided by an 
individual to a candidate in rendering voluntary personal 
services on the iucli\·iJual's residential premises for candi-
. date-related activities if the cumulatirn value of such activi-
ties by such incfo·idunl on behalf of any candidate do not 
exceed $500 with respect to any election; 
(E) any unrcimlmrsed payment for travel expenses made 
by an incliviclunl " ·ho, on his own behalf, volunteers his per-
sonal sen·ices to a candidate if the cumulative amount for 
such individual incurred "·ith respect to such can<lidat{l docs 
not exceed $500 with respect to any election; 
· (F) any communication by any person which is not made 
for the purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or 
election, of any person to Federal office; or 
( G) the payment by a State or local committee of a politi-
cal party of the costs of preparation, display, or mailing or 
other distribution incurred by such committee with respect to 
a printed slate card or sample ballot, or other printed listing, 
of three or more candidates for any public office for "hich 
an election is held in the State in which such committee is 
organized, except that this clause shall not apply in the case 
of costs incurred by such committee with respect to a display 
of any such listing made on broadcasting stations, or in news-
papers, magazines, or other similar types of general public 
political adYertising; or 
(H) any payment made or obligation incurred by a cor-
poration or a labor organization which, under the provisions 
of the last paragraph of section 610 of title 18, United States 
Code, would not constitute an expenditure by such corpora-




5. See supra, at 
6. 357 U.S., at 463, quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 
U.S. 235, 265 (1957) (concurring opinion). See also Gibson v. 
Florida Legislative Association, supra, 372 U.S., at 546; 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S., at 438; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 
supra, 361 U.S., at 524. We also have characterized the 
requisite interest as"substantial." Alabama, supra, 357 U.S., 
at 464; Button, supra, 371 U.S. at 444; Bates, supra, 361 
U.S., at 525. 
7. Bates v. City of Little Rock, supra, at 525. 
8. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Association, supra, at 546. 
9. See supra, at 
10. See supr5 at 
11. H.R. Rep. No. 92-564, at 4 (1971). 
12. Id.; Sen. Rep. No. 93-689, at 2 (1974). 
13. We have said elsewhere that "informed public opinion 
is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment." 
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1963). 
Compare United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) 
(upholding disclosure requirements imposed on lobbyists by 
the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 812). 
14. Other People's Money 92 (1914). 
· 15. See text accompanying footnote 1, supra. 
. / 
H. 
16. Postelection disclosure by successful candidates 
is suggested as a less restrictive way of preventing corrupt 
pressures on office-holders. Delayed disclosure of this 
sort would not serve the equally important informational 
function played by pre-election reporting. Moreover, the 
public interest in sources of campaign funds is likely to 
be at its peak during the campaign period; that is the time 
when improper influences are most likely to be brought 
to light. 
17. See Developments in the Law - Elections, 88 
. . 
... 1111, 
Harv. L. Rev./ 1247 n. 75 (1975) • 
« r"t f 
18. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,132 (1968) 
( 11There is, of course, no reason why two parties should 
retain a pe_rmanent monopoly on the right to have people 
vote for or against them. Competition in ideas and 
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral 
Sweez7 v. New process and of the First Amendment freedoms.•~:} HampsElrre, 
354 U.S. 234, 250-251 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
19. Cf. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 
(1963). 
I. 
20. Appellants' brief, at 173. 
21. For example, -a campaign workers who had solicited 
'- · 1 
campaign funds for the Libertarian Party in New York 
testified that two persons solicited in a Party campaign 
"refused to contribute because they were unwilling for their 
names to be disclosed or published." District court findings 
of fact, Wertheimer, 1 6. None of the appellants offer 
stronger evidence of threats of harassment. 
22. Appellants' brief, at 173. 
23. These criteria were suggested by Chief Judge 
Bazelon, concurring in part and dissenting in part in the 
decision below. 519 F.2d, at 907 n. 1. 
' 1· • ~---
to this litigation 
24. The Socialist Labor Party, which is not a party 
but has filed an amicus brief in support of appellants, 
claims to be able to offer evidence of "direct suppression, 
intimidation, harassment, physical abuse, and loss of 
economic sustenancen relating to its contributors. 
Socialist Labor Party brief, at 6. 
' 
~ 
in existence• 1877. 
25. See infra, at 




26. Compare Talley v. California, supra, 362 U.S., at 
531. 
27. 519 F.2d at 907 n. 1. 
28. 519 F.2d, at 909. See also Developments in the 
Law - Elections, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1111, 124S-1249 (l9DJ. 
28a. § 434(e) provides: 
"Contributions or ex enditures b erson other 
than po itica committee or can i ate. Every person 
(other than a political committee or candidate) who 
makes contributions or expenditures, other than by 
contribution to a political committee or candidate, 
in an aggregate amount of $100 within a calendar year 
shall file with the Corrnnission a statement containing 
the information required by this section. Statements 
required by this subsection shall be filed on the dates 
on which reports by political committees are filed but 
need not be cumulative." 
29. See supra at_ (PS) 
30. 86 Stat. 16 (1972) . 
31. 88 Stat. 1265 (1975). 
32. S. Rep. No. 92-229, at 57 (1971). 
33. See note 3 supra. 
34. Section 441(a) provides: "Any person who violates 
any of the provisions of this chapter shall be fined not 
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or 
both." 




36. Similar difficulties arose under the 1971 Act, 
------·~·-·• 
before amendment. At least two lower court~~have construed 
the disclosure requirements imposed on "political committees" 
by§ 434(a) to be nonapplicable to nonpartisan organizations w 
~-•------:---~.,•-• ..... •· -.~ - ,~ . ...-• •---r .. ----•·--••-• • •- --•---- -........_ . __.,,-' 
/ .5 f' ( k I ng --~-·- r • 
, i:fl---er-der~ to avoid questions of unconstitutionality, ' American 
------- oi --- ----- - -· ----~--- -
Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Suppa 1041 
(D.D.C. 1973), vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v. American 
Civil Liberties Union, u. s. (June 23, 1975); 
United States v. National Committee for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 
1135 (C.A~ 2, 1972). 
37. See supra at_ (PS). 
38. See supra, at 
39. S. Rep. No. 92-96, at 33 (1971); S. Rep. No. 
93-689, 1-2 (1974). 
40. See supra, at • (PS) 
41. See supra, at . (PS) 
42. Section 43l(d) defines "political committeerr 
as "any committee, club, association, or other group 
of persons which receives contributions or makes 
expenditures during a calendar year in an aggregat e 




43. See 519 F.2d, at 863, n. 112, and cases discussed 
in note 36 supra. 
44. Some partisan committees - ~-hat- ~ groups 
within the control of the candidate or primarily organized 
for political activities - will fall within§ 434(e) 
because their contributions and expenditures fall in 
W~l~ 
the $100-to;l,000 . range. Groups of this sort do not A 
have contributions and expenditures under $1,000 are 
not "political committees" within the definition in§ 431(d); 
those whose transactions are not as great as $100 are not 
required to .file statements under§ 434(e). 
45. See supra, at_ . 
46. "Looked at by itself without regard to the 
necessity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary. 
It might as well or nearly as well be a little more to one 
side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or 
point there must be, and that there is no mathematical 
or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of 
the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that 
it is very wide of any reasonable mark." Louisville Gas 
& Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). 
/ 
47. Section 434(d) provides in full: 
(d) Members of Congress, reporting exemption. This section docs 
!!Q!: _rc<p1iLc __ ~_}f<.'mb~_r of _th~ g~ngress to report, as c<:>ntributions 
reccn~r<Tor as <'Xprnd1tures made, the Yalnc of photogr:l:ph1c. matting, 
or reconling ser\'iccs furni_shcd ~fo71i!f1 · by the-· Senate Recordin!!: 
Stii<lio, the Jionsc .. Rccorcling Studio, or by an individual whose pa3, 
is <lisbursc<l by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the Honse 
of Rrpresentati,es and who furnishes snch services as his primary 
duty as an employee of the Senate or House of RepresentativeS,-9.J' 
if such services were paid for by the Repnblican or Democratic Sen-
atorial Campaign Committee, the Drmocrutic Kational Congressional 
Committee, or the N"ational Republican Congressional Committee. 
This subsection {loes not applv to such recording services furnished 
<l~n_!!: the calendar Y.ear before the year in ,vhich the Member's term 
exo.u:e~. 
M 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































